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Real-Time vs. Historical Cell-Site Data in Pennsylvania (2025): History, Warrants, Exigency, and Mapping Tools

  • Writer: Gregory T. Moro, Esq.
    Gregory T. Moro, Esq.
  • 12 minutes ago
  • 4 min read

Bottom line:

  • Historical CSLI (cell site location information) records carriers already keep generally requires a warrant under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Carpenter v. United States (2018).

  • Real-time CSLI (prospective tracking) also requires warrant-level process under Pennsylvania law; the PA Supreme Court’s Commonwealth v. Pacheco (2021) scrutinized “orders” that function like warrants and demanded Carpenter-style protections.

  • Pennsylvania’s Constitution (Art. I, § 8) can provide more protection than the federal floor—Commonwealth v. Alexander (2020) is the most recent, big example (automobile searches), and its reasoning influences digital-privacy analysis.


A brief history: from pen registers to CSLI

  • Pen registers & the third-party doctrine (1979–2000s): police often obtained dialed-number records and later basic phone metadata without warrants, relying on the idea that you “shared” it with a company.

  • The smartphone turn: As carriers began logging connection events to nearby towers, CSLI datasets could reconstruct people’s movements over days or months. In 2018, the Supreme Court held that obtaining historical CSLI is a Fourth Amendment search that generally requires a warrant, stressing the “near perfect surveillance” such records enable.


Why that matters: The warrant rule in Carpenter reshaped how police, providers, and courts treat historical records. It also helped drive Pennsylvania’s approach to real-time tracking.

Pennsylvania’s path on real-time CSLI

Before Carpenter, agencies sometimes used state “tracking” or provider-records orders for prospective pings. Pennsylvania has since aligned warrant requirements across the board:

  • Commonwealth v. Pacheco (Pa. 2021): The Court evaluated real-time CSLI orders as functional warrants—requiring probable cause, particularity, and Carpenter-level rigor. The Court warned that if the Commonwealth cannot meet those requisites, suppression follows.

  • Procedural & statutory backdrop:

    • 18 Pa.C.S. § 5743 (provider disclosures) and related Chapter 57 provisions govern when law enforcement can compel carrier records, layered on top of warrant requirements.

    • 210 Pa. Code Rule 3545 lays out what an order must contain for mobile communication tracking (probable cause, identity fields, offenses, and a 60-day cap). Treat this like warrant-level process post-Carpenter/Pacheco.


Exigency still exists, but it’s narrow. Pennsylvania’s Article I, § 8 jurisprudence generally demands both probable cause and exigent circumstances to excuse a warrant in comparable contexts (e.g., vehicles). Courts are cautious about stretching “exigency” to routine phone tracking. Expect suppression where agencies rely on thin emergency rationales instead of getting a warrant.


Historical CSLI after Carpenter

  • Warrants are the norm. The Supreme Court emphasized how historical logs enable retrospective, comprehensive tracking—so the old “third-party doctrine” isn’t enough by itself.

  • Pennsylvania courts have followed suit, treating historical CSLI as sensitive data demanding a probable-cause warrant absent a recognized exception.


2025 developments to watch: geofence/keyword “big data” warrants

Although not CSLI per se, geofence warrants (Google “Location History” around a crime scene/time) are the next frontier of location privacy:

  • In September 2025, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld a Google geofence warrant, crediting narrow time and place parameters and multi-step minimization. (Look for the Choice line of decisions; PSP Trooper Tray’s affidavits figured prominently.)

  • Nationally, the issue is hot and split—some courts approve geofences; others disallow them as overbroad dragnets. Expect spillover arguments into CSLI reasonableness, particularity, and good-faith debates.


Mapping and analysis tools (CellHawk, etc.): what they do—and don’t

Investigators (and defense experts) don’t plot towers by hand anymore. Tools like CellHawk import carrier returns (call-detail/CSLI), then map, timeline, heat-map, and link devices and events across providers. They can also visualize geofence or ride-share/GPS data. None of this replaces legal process—it’s analysis after the data is obtained.

Defense angle: ask for the full ingest → transform → analyze chain (what was fed in; what filters; what assumptions about sector coverage; whether drive-testing validated ranges). Cross-examine heat-maps that imply precision beyond what tower density supports.


Practical guidance

For clients (non-lawyers)

  • Assume phones are trackable. Keep your device locked; don’t consent to a “quick look.” A warrant is usually required to search contents; location orders must meet Carpenter/Pacheco rigor.

  • If your phone is seized, ask for a lawyer and avoid providing passcodes/biometrics until counsel advises (separate Fifth-Amendment issues).


For defense counsel

Early preservation & targeted discovery

  • Demand the warrants/orders, affidavits, returns (historical and real-time), including provider certifications and any emergency-disclosure paperwork. Cite § 5743 and Rule 3545.

  • Request tool outputs: raw carrier files, parsing logs, CellHawk project files, settings, heat-map parameters, and any validation (drive tests, RF analysis).


Suppression theories (common)

  • No warrant / wrong process for historical CSLI (Carpenter).

  • Real-time orders lacking probable cause/particularity (Pacheco).

  • Overbreadth / lack of minimization in geofences and “reverse” returns (time/place too wide; step-two/three identification too loose). Pennsylvania’s 2025 case shows what courts expect when they uphold them—use it as a ceiling, not a floor.

  • Good-faith limits: where law was settled locally (e.g., warrants for CSLI), argue exclusion even if officers thought the SCA or a generic “tracking” order was enough.


Expert workups

  • Hire a radio-frequency/telecom expert to address tower sectorization, handoffs, and coverage. Re-map with alternative parameters to test the prosecution’s story. If CellHawk (or similar) was used, replicate with the same input files and disclose discrepancies.


For prosecutors (what wins on appeal)

  • Show narrow windows (short time spans), tight geographies, and particularized probable cause.

  • Use stepwise minimization for geofences; document every narrowing step.

  • Keep a clean audit trail from provider return to courtroom exhibit; provide certifications and tool provenance.


Quick reference (primary sources)

  • Historical CSLI requires a warrant: Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018) (PDF). (Supreme Court)

  • Real-time CSLI scrutiny / warrant-equivalents: Commonwealth v. Pacheco (Pa. 2021). (Pennsylvania Courts)

  • Article I, § 8 can go beyond the federal floor: Commonwealth v. Alexander (Pa. 2020). (Justia Law)

  • PA provider-disclosure framework: 18 Pa.C.S. § 5743 (and related Chapter 57 sections). (Justia Law)

  • Order requirements for mobile-tracking process: 210 Pa. Code Rule 3545. (pacodeandbulletin.gov)

  • Geofence in PA (2025): Superior Court opinions upholding a tightly drawn geofence (see Choice/J-A20010-25, Sept. 18–19, 2025). (Pennsylvania Courts)

NOTHING IN THIS OR ANY OTHER BLOG POST CONSTITUTES LEGAL ADVICE OR FORMS AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FIRM AND THE READER. INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM THIS WEBSITE IS INTENDED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.

Data map showing Cell Site Data Information

 
 
 

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