When Criminal Law Meets Immigration Law in Pennsylvania

Why routine pleas can carry life-altering immigration consequences

As a practicing criminal defense attorney in Pennsylvania, I’ve learned that one of the most consequential questions in a case often isn’t “Will I win?” but “What happens after I plead?” For non-citizens—and even for some naturalized U.S. citizens—that question can involve consequences far beyond the sentencing guidelines: detention by ICE, removal proceedings, separation from family, loss of lawful status, and a lifetime bar to returning.

The central thesis is simple: a Pennsylvania criminal case can quietly become an immigration case, because the immigration consequences flow primarily from federal law and from how federal authorities classify the conviction, not from how the Commonwealth labels it.

Federal law controls the consequence even when state court controls the sentence

Pennsylvania trial courts decide guilt and impose sentence. But immigration outcomes are governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and are adjudicated in federal immigration proceedings. That means a “good” state-court outcome can still be an immigration disaster if the conviction falls into a deportability category the INA treats as essentially automatic.

A common misconception is that a “misdemeanor” is “minor,” or that a short county sentence is “safe.” Immigration law does not consistently honor those instincts. The federal analysis often turns on statutory elements, the “record of conviction,” and technical definitions like “conviction,” “crime involving moral turpitude,” and “aggravated felony.”

The categories that do the damage: CIMTs, controlled substances, aggravated felonies

Immigration law relies on categorical buckets. Two of the most common in Pennsylvania practice are:

• Controlled-substance convictions (often deportability triggers even without jail time, depending on the statute and facts).

• Crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) (a notoriously litigated concept that can turn on mens rea, fraud, and theft-type conduct).

Then there is the category that tends to be the most unforgiving:

“Aggravated felony” does not mean “aggravated” or “felony” in the Pennsylvania sense

In Mariazza v. Attorney General (3d Cir. 2022), the court addressed a Pennsylvania theft-by-deception conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1) where the defendant received an indeterminate sentence of 7 to 23 months. The Third Circuit treated the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence as controlling for the “one year” threshold and upheld removability on the theory that the conviction met the INA’s “aggravated felony theft offense” definition.

In plain English: a sentence that looks like “under two years in county” can still satisfy the federal one-year threshold, and a Pennsylvania theft-by-deception plea can be analyzed as an “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes.

The constitutional duty to advise: not optional, not “collateral,” and still litigated

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision Padilla v. Kentucky held that competent criminal defense representation requires advising a non-citizen client about deportation risk connected to a plea.

Pennsylvania appellate courts continue to see the downstream litigation when that advice is missing—or when the record is too thin to prove what was said.

A Pennsylvania example where the plea did not survive post-conviction review

In Commonwealth v. Ramirez-Contreras (Pa. Super. 2024), the Superior Court reversed the denial of PCRA relief where plea counsel lacked knowledge of the client’s immigration status and the immigration consequences, and the client testified he would not have accepted the plea if he had understood it would lead to deportation. The court found prejudice and remanded so the defendant could withdraw the guilty plea.

This is the cautionary tale: if counsel doesn’t identify immigration risk early, plea negotiations may never even attempt to mitigate it—and the plea can later be attacked as unknowing/involuntary.

A Pennsylvania example where the plea did survive because the record was built

Contrast Ramirez-Contreras with Commonwealth v. Thomas (Pa. Super. 2022). There, the plea colloquy and written plea statement included explicit warnings—including language acknowledging possible mandatory deportation and an opportunity to consult immigration counsel—and the Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief.

Takeaway: courts often decide these cases on the record. If the record memorializes warnings and consultation opportunities, post-conviction challenges get much harder.

A very recent federal Pennsylvania decision expanding the “Padilla lens” beyond classic deportation warnings

One of the more striking recent opinions is Vincent v. Delaware County District Attorney (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2024). The court granted habeas relief where counsel failed to advise a naturalized citizen defendant about the plea’s potential consequences of denaturalization and deportation, concluding counsel had a constitutional duty under Strickland/Padilla to advise on those consequences.

That matters because it underscores a broader point practitioners sometimes miss: immigration-adjacent consequences can include citizenship status in certain postures, and the duty analysis may extend past the stereotypical “green card defendant” scenario.

Why “state labels” can mislead: the federal definition of “conviction” and the petty-offense trap

Another recurring issue is the gap between how a state classifies an offense and how the INA treats it.

In Avila v. Attorney General (3d Cir. 2023), the Third Circuit treated certain New Jersey “disorderly persons” offenses as “convictions” of “crimes” for immigration purposes, rejecting the idea that a state’s non-criminal label automatically insulates a person from immigration consequences.

You don’t need to practice in New Jersey for that lesson to apply in Pennsylvania: federal immigration law has its own vocabulary, and state nomenclature can be a false comfort.

The record of conviction: why ambiguity can be fatal

Even where the defense has plausible arguments that a conviction might fit an exception or might not be a disqualifying offense, immigration proceedings frequently turn on what the record actually shows.

In Pereida v. Wilkinson (U.S. 2021), the Supreme Court held that when a noncitizen bears the burden to prove eligibility for discretionary relief, ambiguity in the record as to which statutory alternative formed the basis of conviction can defeat eligibility. (Supreme Court)

That’s a practical warning for plea practice: what goes into the record (and what stays out) can control the immigration case years later. (Supreme Court)

The accelerating trend: “aggravated felony” theories keep expanding

The Supreme Court continues to interpret aggravated-felony provisions broadly. In Pugin v. Garland (U.S. 2023), the Court held that an offense can “relate to obstruction of justice” for aggravated-felony purposes even without a pending investigation or proceeding requirement. (Supreme Court)

Whether or not your Pennsylvania case involves obstruction, the direction of travel matters: categorical aggravated-felony theories are not shrinking, and defense counsel must assume immigration screening is part of competent plea counseling. (Supreme Court)

Practical plea-practice implications in Pennsylvania

This isn’t entirely academic. In many cases, the immigration outcome hinges on details that look “small” in state court:

• Which subsection of a statute is pled to

• Whether the record describes fraud/deceit

• The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence (even when minimum confinement is brief)

• Whether the plea record reflects warnings and consultation (compare Thomas with Ramirez-Contreras)

  
  

Defense counsel checklist: building a plea strategy with immigration in mind

This is a practice-focused checklist I use (and teach younger lawyers) to reduce preventable “crimmigration” harm:

1. Screen early (first substantive meeting)

   Ask directly about citizenship, lawful status, and prior immigration history—then document the answer.

   
   

2. Flag “high-risk buckets” immediately

   Controlled substances, theft/fraud, violence/DOM-coded offenses, and anything that could be argued as obstruction.

   
   

3. Consult immigration counsel when consequences are plausible

   Not as a formality—because the solution may be charge-selection or record-crafting in this case.

   
   

4. Negotiate with consequences in mind—not just county time

   “Good” Pennsylvania outcomes can still trigger federal removability (see Mariazza).

   
   

5. Build a defensible record

   If the risk is clear, ensure the plea record shows the client was advised and understood (the “Thomas” model).

   If immigration counseling is ongoing, consider whether the plea should be continued to permit consultation.

   
   

6. Avoid unnecessary factual admissions

   Immigration proceedings often mine plea colloquies and stipulations. Say what is necessary—no more.

   
   

7. Confirm language access and comprehension

   Interpreter needs and comprehension issues aren’t “soft issues”; they become litigation issues later.

   
   

8. Don’t assume the warning is “collateral”

   Courts increasingly treat these consequences as intertwined with the plea’s voluntariness (see Padilla, and the Pennsylvania and federal applications that follow).

   
   

Bottom line

In Pennsylvania, the plea bargaining table is often the only place where a defendant’s future can be protected in both systems at once. The hard truth is that a plea can “solve” the criminal case while detonating the immigration case—sometimes automatically, sometimes years later, and sometimes based on technicalities that nobody discussed on the day of the plea.

If you represent non-citizens (or clients with complex citizenship/immigration histories), immigration screening is no longer “nice to have.” It is part of competent criminal defense practice—because once the federal machinery starts moving, state court cannot reliably put the consequences back in the bottle.

Footnotes

1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

2. Commonwealth v. Ramirez-Contreras, 2024 PA Super 162 (Pa. Super. July 31, 2024).

3. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 2022 PA Super 26 (Pa. Super. Feb. 15, 2022).

4. Vincent v. Delaware County District Attorney, No. 2:24-cv-01037 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2024) (granting habeas; duty to advise regarding denaturalization/deportation risk).

5. Pablo Mariazza v. Attorney General, No. 21-2606 (3d Cir. Oct. 7, 2022) (Pa. theft by deception; indeterminate sentence treated as max term; aggravated-felony theft offense analysis).

6. Avila v. Attorney General, No. 22-1374 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 2023) (state labels vs. INA “conviction/crime” analysis).

7. Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754 (2021) (record ambiguity and burden of proof for relief).

8. Pugin v. Garland, 599 U.S. 600 (2023) (aggravated felony “relating to obstruction of justice”; no pending proceeding required). (Supreme Court)

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About the Author

Gregory T. Moro is a seasoned litigator with over three decades of experience advocating for clients in both civil and criminal matters. A founding partner of Moro & Moro, Attorneys at Law, based in Pennsylvania, Mr. Moro has built a reputation for courtroom excellence, particularly in complex appellate practice and high-stakes litigation.

Mr. Moro’s legal acumen is highlighted by his admission to the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the U.S. Federal Court for the Third Circuit (Middle District) and the courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. His appellate work has established significant legal precedents in Pennsylvania, including successful arguments in cases such as Commonwealth v. Crossley and Commonwealth v. Stone, which reinforced constitutional protections and procedural rights.

He earned his Juris Doctor from the University of Dayton School of Law and graduated cum laude from the University of Scranton. Mr. Moro is an active member of the National Association of Defense Lawyers and the Pennsylvania Association of Defense Lawyers.

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